6 Principles of Animal Research Ethics | Beauchamp and DeGrazia

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In Principles of Animal Research Ethics (2020) by Tom L. Beauchamp and David DeGrazia, the authors introduce a framework of six principles meant to expand upon the 3Rs framework in animal research ethics.

The intention of the six-principle framework seems to be to codify general principles of agreement between researchers who use animals and activists who oppose animal testing.

The authors seek to establish necessary conditions for ethical animal testing, but do note that meeting all six requirements is not a sufficient condition for ethical animal testing — meaning that an experiment cannot be ethical if it violates one of the principles, but an experiment that follows all six principles is still not necessarily ethical.

(So, while an abolitionist vegan might be put off by a framework that implicitly condones animal research to start with, the book itself technically does not give it a unilateral stamp of approval)

I think Beauchamp and DeGrazia’s six principles do a pretty good job of establishing more stringent moral guidelines for animal research. The six principles are a lot less vague than the 3Rs.

The principles are split into two categories: those pertaining to the expected social benefit of the research, and those pertaining to the welfare of the lab animals.

Principles of Social Benefit

1) The Principle of No Alternative Method

It must be shown that using animals is the ONLY way to answer a research question that has the potential for social benefit. If there is another known way to answer the question, then using animals is not ethical.

2) The Principle of Expected Net Benefit

It must be shown that the potential for social benefit is higher than “expected costs and risks” to humans.

  • Note that this principle deals specifically with weighing human benefits and costs, NOT animal benefits and costs
    • some examples of human costs that could result from an animal experiment, specifically in the preclinical drug testing case, are false toxicity negatives — when a compound is deemed safe in animals but is not actually safe for humans, and false toxicity positives — when a compound is deemed unsafe in animals but would be safe in humans, leading to an opportunity cost since the compound would be prematurely abandoned)
  • Note also that both the magnitude AND the likelihood of the benefits and harms should be taken into account — so an experiment that has a chance of leading to a significant breakthrough but that chance is only 1%, might not make the cut

3) The Principle of Sufficient Value to Justify Harm

It must be shown that the expected benefit to humans is enough to justify the expected harms to the animals.

  • This is the vaguest of the principles and is admittedly pretty clever on that point, because, sure, it allows for agreement between people with vastly different perceptions of the moral status of animals
  • Essentially all the principle says is that somebody should decide whether the study is worth it — presumably the IACUC or some other stakeholder — but it doesn’t say anything about how that decider should weigh the interests of the animals against the social benefits of the research. So if it was up to someone who believes animal’s rights are strong enough to preclude exploiting or harming them for any amount of human benefit, then no experiment would meet this requirement, but most of the time, that’s not going to be anyone on an IACUC, the body that approves animal research protocols.
  • for the goal of the book, which was to lay out 6 principles that reasonable people can agree on, this is good, but in terms of actual moral direction, it doesn’t elucidate much

Principles of Animal Welfare

1) The Principle of No Unnecessary Harm

The study must not subject animals to harms unless when “necessary for and morally justified by scientific purposes”

  • This principle ties back to the three social benefit principles in its reference to the experiment being both morally and scientifically justified. That justification comes from satisfying the three social benefit principles.
  • Functionally, this principle works as a prohibition on harms that aren’t directly related to the research protocol. If a researcher doesn’t feed the lab animals properly, if technicians handle them badly and cause distress, etc., then the study violates this principle.
  • This principle also entails minimizing any “justified” harms

2) The Principle of Basic Needs

Animals used in the study must have all of their basic needs met unless a lack thereof is morally and scientifically justified (by meeting the previous 4 principles)

  • Beauchamp and DeGrazia go on to elaborate that these basic needs include minimized pain, adequate shelter, water, stimulation, mental and physical health, etc.
    • They add that the 6 principles do NOT address whether “freedom from premature death” is a basic need or not. (It’s worth noting that in their estimation mercy killing doesn’t count as a premature death)
    • They also note that in species like monkeys, psychological health must also be attended to

3) The Principle of Upper Limits to Harm

The study protocol must not subject animals to “severe, long-lasting suffering” except when “critically important social and scientific purposes are demonstrated”

  • In order to implement this principle, institutions would have to rigorously define what qualifies as severe and long-lasting suffering
  • Note that this principle can still be satisfied if the protocol requires that the animals be euthanized before the point at which their suffering reaches the maximum allowable harm
  • Surprisingly, this type of rule is not in place except for in the EU and some other countries. (You would think this would be the bare minimum)
  • Note that while the exception is stressed to be only for extraordinary circumstances, there still is an exception loophole in the principle

Overall, I think these six principles are a step up from the 3Rs because of their improved specificity and more stringent constraints on permissible harm. However, I would really like to read more on how one should weigh social benefit against harms to animals, as discussed in principle 3.

Fun fact: I actually studied biology in college and for a while wanted to become a biomedical researcher so I had to deal with the animal testing issue a lot. That specific ethical dilemma is a big part of why I started this blog.

For whatever reason, people are a lot more up in arms in general about animals in labs than animals in torture factories factory farms, despite the fact that a) lab animal welfare is far more regulated b) there are far fewer animals in labs than in factory farms and c) if we’re talking specifically about a subset of translational research, disease cures are a whole lot more “necessary” than your steak dinner.

Yet, I too spend an inordinate amount of time agonizing over this issue — precisely because I can’t settle on an ethically perfect solution myself. I can think of counter-aguments and counter-arguments to my counter-arguments galore. In my brain it remains an unsolved problem, morally. Factory farming is a bigger problem, but it is morally clear, so it doesn’t become obsessional.

Anyway, in my own life, I know I can wrestle with the moral quandary of the hypothetical cancer research and sacrificial mice all I want, but I am only one person, I am not doing that research, and I am also not going to single-handedly stop it — so practically, incremental ethical advancements, like these principles, are a good thing to endorse for the time being. (And I can hold onto the hope that in 100 years, organoids will be so advanced that they will be better disease models in every way and the question of medical advancement vs. animal rights will no longer even be an issue)

Feel free to leave your thoughts in the comment section

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